The Economics of Crime: An Analysis of Crime Rates in America by Oliver \u2702, Alison
The Park Place Economist
Volume 10 | Issue 1 Article 13
2002
The Economics of Crime: An Analysis of Crime
Rates in America
Alison Oliver '02
Illinois Wesleyan University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Oliver '02, Alison (2002) "The Economics of Crime: An Analysis of Crime Rates in
America," The Park Place Economist: Vol. 10
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol10/iss1/13
The Economics of Crime: An Analysis of Crime Rates in America
Abstract
The purpose of my paper is to determine what factors are significant in determining fluctuations in the crime
rate over time.
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol10/iss1/13
The Park Place Economist Volume X 30
The Economics of  Crime: An Analysis of
Crime Rates in America
Alison Oliver
I.  Introduction
A growing concern across the nation is theheightened incidence of criminal and violentbehavior.  There has been a steadily increas-
ing trend in the crime rate over time until the 1990s,
where the trend begins to fall off (Figure 1).  How-
ever, the fluctuations have been a historical pattern
since 1960, and the causes of them remain unex-
plained.  Since the publication of Gary Becker (1968),
the economics profession has analyzed the determi-
nants of criminal behavior from theoretical and em-
pirical points of view.  The growing public awareness
is justified because rampant crime and violence may
have pernicious effects on economic activity and, more
generally, because they directly reduce the quality of
life of all citizens who must cope with the reduced
sense of personal and proprietary security.  Past re-
search is based on models that look at the incentives
faced by individuals to commit crimes, and possible
causes of the persistence
of crime over time (crimi-
nal inertia).  I will discuss
the elements factoring
into the individual deci-
sion to commit a crime
in my theory section.
Then I will use the na-
tional crime rate over
time in order to predict
a reduced-form analysis
of the country’s aggre-
gate individual decisions.
The purpose of my pa-
per is to determine what
factors are significant in
determining fluctuations
in the crime rate over time.
The rest of the paper will be organized as
follows.  Section II provides a selective review of
theoretical and empirical contributions to the eco-
nomics literature dealing with criminal behavior.
Section III presents the economic model I will be
using, and an explanation of the variables and my
hypotheses for their effects on the crime rate.  Sec-
tion IV presents the results of the regression and
how they are related to the research hypotheses.
Finally, Section V indicates the major conclusions
of the paper and policy implications derived from
my findings.
II.Theory and Literature Review
The theoretical framework behind my pa-
per is based on Beckers Rational Choice model,
where an individuals decision to commit a crime is
based on the costs and
benefits (1968).  In this
model, all potential crimi-
nals have a benefit of
crime (b), includes both
the financial and any ex-
pected psychological
benefits of crime.  An in-
dividual committing crime
faces costs from law-en-
forcement activities.  The
severity of the punish-
ment including fines and
jail time is one part of the
total cost, and the other
part is the probability of
getting caught.  There-
fore, the costs will equal
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FIGURE 1
 Crime Rates per Capita Over  Time
Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports
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the probability of punishment (p) times the cost of
punishment (c).  Thus, the net expected returns from
crime equal:
b-pc
Standard differentiation tells us that the number of
criminals rises as b rises, and falls as p or c rises.
Therefore, the individual decision to commit a crime
is conditional upon the following stipulation:
(b-pc) > 0 (1)
Crime reduction can occur through reducing the ben-
efits of crime, raising the probability of being caught,
or increasing the costs of punishment conditional upon
being caught.
The theoretical model Becker sets up takes
into account benefits, costs, and probability of paying
those costs.  However, opportunity costs seem to be
absent from his model.  Isaac
Ehrlich analyzes the effects of in-
come levels and distribution on
crime in 1973.  He argues that pay-
offs to crime, especially property
crime, depend primarily on the op-
portunities provided by potential
victims of crime, as measured by
the median income of the families
in a given community.  He also con-
siders the effect of unemployment
on crime rates.  He views the un-
employment rate in a community as a complementary
indicator of income opportunities available in the le-
gal labor market.  However, in his empirical study, he
finds that unemployment rates are less important de-
terminants of crime than income levels and distribu-
tion.  These variables are a measure of opportunity
cost (o) which could be added to Beckers model
(equation 1): b-(pc+o).
Another factor Ehrlich (1973) discusses,
which relates to the effect of economic conditions on
the opportunity cost of crime, is the level of education
of the population.  Education helps to determine the
expected rewards from both legal and criminal activi-
ties.  However, after controlling for income inequality
and median income, Ehrlich finds a positive and sig-
nificant relationship between the average number of
school years completed by the adult population (over
25 years) and particularly property crimes commit-
ted across the U.S. in 1960 (1973).  He explains this
in two different ways.  One being that as education
increases a criminal can enter into higher paying sec-
tors of crime.  However, a more probable theory is
explained, especially in connection with property
crimes.  As a nations average educational attainment
increases, income will increase and the payoff of prop-
erty crimes increases, thus increasing criminals ben-
efits (b).  However, it is expected that without the
controls for income, an increase in education could
be associated with higher expected legal earnings and
thus increase the opportunity cost of committing a
crime (o).
Together with the relationship between
ecnomic conditions and crime, one of the main issues
in the pioneering studies of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich
(1973) is the assessment of the effects of police pres-
ence, convictions, and the severity of punishments on
the level of criminal activity.  Individuals who are con-
sidering whether to commit crimes are assumed to
evaluate both the risk of being
caught and the associated punish-
ment.  Their empirical evidence
confirms that both factors have a
negative effect on crime rates.
Analysts often make a subtle
distinction between the
deterrenct effects of policing and
convictions, and the incapacita-
tion effects of locking-up (or kill-
ing, in the case of capital punish-
ment) criminals who may have a
tendency to rejoin the crime industry once they are
released.  Deterrence essentially aims at modifying
the price of crime for all offenders (increasing p and
c).  While incapacitation acts through the removal of
a subset of convicted offenders from the market for
offenses either by relocating them in legitimate labor
markets, or by excluding them from the social scene
for prescribed periods of time.
Steven Levitt (1999) addresses these issues
jointly with one of the most recurrent problems in the
literature mentioned above.  The author attempts to
assess whether the apparent negative relationship
between crime rates and arrest rates are the product
of deterrence effects, incapacitation, or measurement
errors associated with the fact that crime tends to go
unreported.  The author finds that most of this nega-
tive relationship in the U.S. is due to deterrence ef-
fects (increases in p and c), and not measurement
Crime reduction can
occur through reducing
the benefits of crime,
raising the probability of
being caught, or in-
creasing the costs of
punishment conditional
upon being caught.
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error or incapacitation, for most types of crime.
The economics literature on crime has pro-
gressed from an emphasis on economic conditions
(including education) and deterrence effects to more
recent considerations of factors that may explain how
crime is propagated over time and within communi-
ties.  In the next section, I will organize some of the
ideas from the literature in a simple framework.
III.  Empirical Model
For the empirical testing of crime rates, I use
the adapted rational choice model (equation 1) to build
a model in which the dependent variable is the United
States National crime rate (CRIME) and the explana-
tory variables are a number of national economic and
social characteristics.  A summary of these variables
is presented in Table 1.  They are separated into three
groups: Economic Variables, Deterrence Variables,
and Demographic Variables.  The Economic Variables
look at the opportunity cost side of the theoretical
model, arguing that certain factors contribute to the
decision of whether crime is worthwhile.  The Deter-
rence variables test the cost side of the theoretical
equation as well as the probability of getting caught.
The significance of these variables will have impor-
tant policy implications on crime prevention.  The fi-
nal group consists of only one variable (AGE), and is
referred to as the Demographic Variable. The AGE
variable is the percentage of the population between
the ages of 14 and 25.  Criminologists often find in
their studies that this age group has the highest pro-
pensity to commit crimes, so including this variable
will give insight to who the prevention policies should
be geared towards.
For my research I use a log-linear regres-
sion analysis on national time-series data of the
United States. In a linear-log model, the dependent
variable is unchanged but the independent variable
appears in logarithmic form. This model was chosen
because the relationship between the Crime Rate
per capita and the independent variables is non-
linear.  Specifically, the marginal effect of the
independent variables on the Crime Rate per capita,
is increasing at a decreasing rate.  This fitted curve
can then be extrapolated to generate forecasts of
the dependent variable, which is beneficial in policy
implications.
A. Economic Variables
The first variable included is education level,
which may impact the decision to commit a crime in
several ways.  The measurement used for education
is the percent of the population that graduated from
high school.  Higher percentages of the population
that have received a high school diploma (EDC) may
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be associated with higher expected legal earnings, thus
a higher opportunity cost of committing a crime (o).
Education through its civic component may also in-
crease the individuals moral stance.   On the other
hand, education may reduce the costs of committing
crimes or open opportunities for an individual to en-
ter higher-paying crime industries.  Hence the net ef-
fect of education on the individuals decision to com-
mit a crime is ambiguous.  It is possible however, that
school enrollment (ENRL) alone will reduce the time
available for participating in the crime industry, and
therefore have an inverse relationship on crime rates.
ENRL is specifically the percent of the population
enrolled in secondary school.  Thus, the empirical
model will assess the effect of both secondary enroll-
ment rates and educational attainment on crime rates.
The level and growth of economic activity in
society create attractive opportunities for employment
in the legal sector (o increases), but since they also
improve the wealth of other members of society, the
size of the potential loot from crime also rises (b in-
creases).  However, based on past research the ef-
fect GDP has on employment is higher than increased
benefits and therefore, the effect of increased GDP
per capita (GDP) on the individuals decision to commit
a crime should be negative.  The effect of income
inequality (GINI) in society should have a negative
effect as well, depending on the individuals relative
income position.  In the case of the poor, an increase
in inequality may be crime inducing, because such an
increase implies a larger gap between the poors wages
and those of the rich, thus reflecting a larger differ-
ence between the income from criminal and legal ac-
tivities.  Therefore, a rise in inequality will have a posi-
tive impact on some individuals propensity to com-
mit a crime.  The Gini Index is measured by a decimal
between 0 and 1, 1 meaning there is total equality.
So as inequality rises, the number falls and GINI will
have a negative sign.
Ehrlich (1973) considers the effects of un-
employment on crime rates.  The unemployment rate
(UNEMP) can be viewed as a complementary indi-
cator of income opportunities available in the legal
labor market.  Therefore, when unemployment rates
increase, the opportunities in the legal labor sector
decrease (o decreases).
B. Deterrence Variables
The strength of the police and the judicial sys-
tem increases the probabilityof apprehension and the
punishment for criminal actions (p increases), thus
reducing the incentive for an individual to commit a
crime.  This is the crime deterrence effect.  It should
also be noted that the past incidence of crime in soci-
ety might determine an individuals perceived prob-
ability of apprehension via systemic interactions, as
discussed above.  The police rate (PLC), which is
measured as the number of police per 100,000 resi-
dents, will be used as one of the variables to test the
deterrence effect.  To account for the incapacita-
tion effect on criminals, I use the incarceration rates
(INCAR) for prisoners, which is the number incar-
cerated per 100,000 residents.  Incapacitation acts
through the removal of a subset of convicted offend-
ers from the market for offenses, by excluding them
from the social scene for prescribed periods of time.
The individuals past experience in criminal
activities is another important variable that affects in
several ways the decision to commit a crime.  First,
convicts tend to have a limited amount of employ-
ment opportunities, and a lower expected income.
Second, the theory that an individual learns by doing
can apply to criminals as well, which lowers the costs
of committing a crime.  These arguments strongly sug-
gest the possibility of criminal inertia, that is, present
crime incidence explained to some extent by its past
incidence.  Therefore, I will include the lagged crime
rate (LGRTE) variable as a measure of this effect.
The lag accounts for the crime rate one year prior.
C. Demographic Variables
The last variable I use is the percentage of
the population under the age of 25 (AGE).  Crimi-
nologists view the change in the population age distri-
bution as the greatest influence on crime trends.  As a
general rule, the crime rate follows the proportion of
young males in the population.  The number of juve-
niles should be increasing over the next decade, and
some criminologists fear that this will signal a return to
escalating crime rates.  Thus, the age variable is ex-
pected to have a direct relationship with the crime
rate.  My empirical model, using the crime rate as a
function of the above variables will look like this:
CRIME = b1 + b2lnEDC + b3lnENRL + b4lnGDP
+ b5lnGINI + b6lnUNEMP + b7lnINCAR +
b8lnPLC + b9lnLGRTE  + b10lnAGE                       (2)
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IV.  Results
Results of the Linear-log regression using
Crime per capita as the dependent variable are sum-
marized in Table 2.  Unfortunately, the only variable
that served to be significant was the lagged crime rate.
Due to the limitation on crime data available, there
were only 38 cases recorded.  Therefore, a degree
of freedom problem is present, and the only way to
fix it is to increase the sample size or decrease the
number of variables.  Due to the lack of available
data, a decrease in variable number must occur.  The
decision on what variables to eliminate is based on
another problem with the data.  Specifically, EDC,
ENRL, GDP, GINI, and INCAR all are considered
trend variables.   Therefore, a lack of variation within
the variables occurs, and there are similar trends be-
tween all of them, which means the results will not be
clear on the effects each variable has on the crime
rate per capita.  In addition, the lagged crime rate
(LGRTE) may be picking up the influence of the other
independent variables.
In order to test for all the effects, I chose one
variable from each group, that would most fully rep-
resent that effect.  The new model is:
CRIME = ß
1
+ß
2
UNEMP+ß
3
PLC+ß
4
AGE         (3)
The results of the second regression supported my
hypotheses, although explaining less with an R2 of .331
(see Table 3).  The results of the AGE variable sup-
ported my hypothesis that an increased population of
people between the ages of 14 and 25, increased the
crime rate per capita.  This means that the marginal
effect of AGE on CRIME is increasing as AGE in-
creases.  The variable is significant to the .01 level.  In
the log-linear model the elasticity of Y with respect to
X can be calculated using the following equation:
B
n
/Y  (4)
Y is the mean value of CRIME, and B
n
 is the coeffi-
cient of the variable being tested.  This calculation
using the coefficient of AGE from equation 4, results
in a 0.0161 elasticity of AGE with respect to CRIME.
Meaning, there is a 1.6 percent increase in CRIME
(crime per capita) with respect to a 1 percent increase
in AGE (the percent of the population between the
ages of 14-24).
The PLC variable is significant to the .01 level, and
resulted in the expected sign.  The elasticity of CRIME
with respect to PLC, using equation 4, results in -
0.0106.  This translates into a 1 percent decrease in
crime rates per capita with a 1 percent increase in the
police ratio, as hypothesized.  The UEMPL results in
the expected sign, but unfortunately it is insignificant.
The hypothesis is that an increase in unemployment
would increase crime, through a decrease in the op-
portunities to earn money in the legal sector. How-
ever, the insignificant finding parallels that of Ehrlichs
results.
In this paper, I argue that there are two par-
ticularly important areas for research on the econom-
ics of crime.  First, the actual effect of deterrence on
the level of crime continues as a central question for
research.  Although I was only able to test the effect
of police rates on crime, there are other forms of de-
terrence that take place.  Police rates test the prob-
ability effect in Beckers Rational Choice (equation
1), while a measure of the intensity of the punishment
2ELBAT
stluseRnoissergeRraeniL-goLtsriF
)077.=2RdetsujdA(
elbairaV tneiciffeoC ecnacifingiS
tnatsnoC 216.- 301.
selbairaVcimonocE
CDE 8880. 523.
LRNE 589200.- 639.
PDG 4240. 713.
INIG 711300.- 549.
PMENU 510200. 877.
selbairaVecnerreteD
CLP 50130. 725.
RACNI 2830.- 830.
ETRGL 80650. 100.
selbairaVcihpargomeD
EGA 74520. 161.
3ELBAT
stluseRnoissergeRraeniL-goLdnoceS
)133.0=2RdetsujdA(
elbairaV tneiciffeoC ecnacifingiS
tnatsnoC 892.0 600.
EGA 15920.0 110.
CLP 12750.0- 900.
LPMENU 691500.0 112.
35
The Economics of Crime: An Analysuis of Crime Rates in America
The Park Place Economist Volume X
would test the cost of crime.  However, there are
different levels of punishment depending on what kind
of crime one commits.  Future research would benefit
from splitting the crimes into groups and testing each
individually, so this variable could be included.  Sec-
ond, the levels of crime are not just determined by the
level of deterrence.  Indeed, in most studies deter-
rence is important but can explain at best a tiny frac-
tion of the overall level of crime.  In principle, social
factors can explain significantly greater amount of the
variance of crime across space.  Due to data limita-
tions, this study was only able to test the significance
of being between the ages of 14- 24 as the social
factor.  But future research could include measures of
effects such as divorce, abortion rates, or drug use.
Research is increasingly attempting to understand these
factors and find ways to test them.
The policy implications of this model are
somewhat unclear.  The fact that increased police ra-
tios will decrease crime rates obviously implies that
more police should be employed, especially in areas
with more crime.  The significance in the AGE vari-
able implies that there should be policies to keep chil-
dren between the age of 14-24 off the streets and out
of crime.  Programs could be set up in schools or
communities attracting this group to other hobbies,
such as art, music, or sports.
As crime has risen to the top of the theoreti-
cal ideas and empirical findings that can be translated
into popular discourse and carved into public laws.
Gary Becker (1968) crafted what was essentially an
early principle-agent model of crime and punishment:
criminals are rational, self-interested agents whose
behavior is best understood as an optimal response
to the incentives set by the government (or principal)
via expenditures on law enforcement and corrections.
In the years since, others have refined Beckers eco-
nomic approach to the subject, including my own.
My research developed a model in which criminals
know that the probability of detection depends both
on law enforcement monitoring and on the behavior
of the community.  The results imply that the decision
to commit a crime is a cost benefit analysis, therefore
future research should focus in on the population be-
tween the ages 14  25.  Within this group the ben-
efits of crime are the material items received from the
act, or feelings of psychological empowerment, which
is hard to measure.  However, when turning to the
costs of crime, one can look at the severity of the
punishment, which includes fines and jail time, or the
probability of getting caught.  The significance of the
two variables on the cost side of the decision to com-
mit a crime has different policy implications and would
be important for future research.
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